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ASSESSMENT OF TWO ACCIDENTS
INVOLVING SAFETY DEVICES




This paper mainly aims at describing and analysing two accidents : an ammonia
leakage and an explosion in a chemical unit. These accidents are in connection with
safety equipment failures. Lessons are pointed out for each accident and, finally,
conclusions are drawn about possible requirements for safety devices and the
interest of testing them.
1. INTRODUCTION
In relation to the real or supposed risks, the actions currently carried out generally
consist in setting up devices known as «safety devices» to reduce the occurrence or
the gravity of potential accidents.
These devices are sometimes passive (walls, retention) but generally active, in the
sense that they require at least a source of energy or a sequence of activation.
These devices are frequently described as « safe », proof of the confidence which is
primarily granted to them, but these qualities are not always related to explicitly
defined criteria.
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The application of prescriptions associated with the regulations resulting from the
« SEVESO Directive » (/1/) also tends to multiply the recourse to such devices, the
risk being « to collect them » and to expose themselves to their own failures. To a
certain extent, the failure of these « safety devices », on sites where modifications
have been undertaken, makes it possible to qualify some recent accidents as « post-
SEVESO accidents ».
This paper presents briefly hereafter two of these accidents. An ammonia leakage
on a rail tank cars unloading installation and an explosion in a chemical unit. In
addition to the lessons which can be drawn directly from those, this article reminds,
in conclusion, important requirements for the qualification of these « safety
devices ».
2. AMMONIA LEAKAGE (DECEMBER 16,1994)
2.1 SUMMARY OF THE EVENT









Figure 1: Diagram of the rail tank cars unloading installation .
During an operation of unloading ammonia from a tank car, an arm of transfer is
disconnected brutally a few minutes after the beginning of the operation. An escape
on the liquid phase occurs.
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Several actions on the emergency stops remain ineffective and the hook fastening,
maintaining the valve of the car, does not open. The formed cloud prevents any
access to the chemical protection suits located near the unloading installation.
A foreman of the installation back turn to the wind, equipped with a simple mask,
makes profit from the immobility of the arm and a momentary transfer of the aerosols
cloud to approach at ten meters from the car. He then succeeds in launching a
wheel block on the hook. This one unhooks from its housing and makes fall the valve
from the car, thus stopping the ammonia escape.
The quantity of ammonia rejected is approximately 27 tons, in 37 minutes. Nobody
was wounded. Ammonia odours are perceived up to 8 km downwind.
2.2 ANALYSIS {121)
This installation was equipped with an automatic device of disconnection for the
transfer arm (loading or unloading), called « powered breakaway coupler ». The
breakaway sequence was engaged as soon as a movement of car was detected on
the track. The objective was to put the installation in a secure state, with respect to
the potential consequences of a collision between the car being unloaded and
another car. This device was an additional one compared to the traditional safety
arrangements at the time of unloading operations.
The analysis of this accident showed that the detection device for the approach of a
car on the track was the initiating event of this accident. An order (output signal) was
generated by this device, following probably some operations on the track.
As much the initiating event has an unspecified cause, as much the induced events
occurred according to the programmed sequence. They correspond to an awaited
response of the automatism.
In particular, the electronic control system started the automatic procedure of
disconnection of the transfer arms. The gas phase safety valves of the arm were well
closed. The same applies to the safety valves isolating the units. Unfortunately, on
car side, the liquid phase valve of the powered breakaway coupler remained wedged
by a nut. Moreover, the hook which was to jump automatically at the time of an
emergency procedure remained hung in its fastening.
According to the research undertaken by the company, the nut (standard M16HH)
which blocked the liquid phase valve of the arm, on car side, does not originate from
the material used in the factory. Its origin remains unknown to date. It should be
noted that the presence of nuts, preventing the dissociation of two elements of a
loading arm, had already been observed a few months earlier.
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During the analysis of this accident, several anomalies could be highlighted. In
particular, it is possible to point out :
• the order of tilting the pneumatic hook fastening was maintained only during
the safety valve closing. The detection of the end of the safety valve closing
annihilated any order of tilting the fastening ;
• In addition, at the electronic control system level, the sequence setting in
safety, started by the emergency stops, should have rocked open the
fastening of the hook. In fact, this sequence of setting in safety was
activated only when someone pressed on the button. It was stopped in the
event of relaxation of this button. The order given by the action on the
emergency stop was thus fugitive or not maintained ;
• the hook position on its fastening could give a mechanical jamming, even in
the event of effective fastening tilting.
2.3 LESSONS
This accident results from a double failure : non releasing of the hook and wedging
by a nut in partially open position of the liquid phase valve arm, on car side.
The principal lessons of this accident within the framework of this article are :
• the possible mechanical failures should be taken into consideration, whether
they are specific to the system such as mechanical jamming or resulting
from an external event (for example, presence of foreign bodies in the
installation) ;
• A validation, using in particular tests of the actions performed by the « safety
loop » would probably have made it possible to detect several anomalies ;
• Lastly, the ultimate barrier, consisting in the intervention of equipped
personnel, must be organised : adequate equipment for the personnel out of
the accident potential effect zone and devices on the installation facilitating
the approach and the operations.
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3. EXPLOSION IN A CHEMICAL UNIT (MAY 18,1996)
3.1 SUMMARY
At 5 :34, the lightning causes an important decrease of voltage during 140 ms on the
90 kV power supply network of a chemical plant. As a result, for one chemical unit, a
switch occurs between the power alimentation and the emergency power unit. After
this voltage variation, the normal voltage input does not change anything, because
of an emergency power unit internal 16 minutes time lag programmation.
For this installation, in these conditions, the emergency power unit tries to take over,
without success.
So the 220 volts and 24 volts tension (see Figure 3) delivered by the emergency
power unit decreases gradually and various equipment are stop. The « double-
effect » valves, normally staying in the same status, open and particularly the valves
which allowed the decompression of the gas network for all reactors. It should be
noted that, by design, the gas mixture is flammable in the gas network in connection
with the reactors.
Consequently, a flammable mixture is evacuated by a chimney. Moreover, the
opening of these valves allows a continuity between the sky of the reactors and the
atmosphere at the exit of the chimney.
The available elements make it possible to locate the beginning of the process of
explosion a few minutes later, when the release through the chimney is quite
evanescent. At 5 :41, the lightning strikes the unit, ignites the flammable release and
makes possible to a flame front to propagate through pipes and equipment in
communication together. Three apparatus break successively : a cyclone, a tank and
a reactor. As example, the photography hereafter (see Figure 2) represents the
destroyed reactor.
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\Figure 2: view of the destroyed reactor.
3.2 ANALYSIS (/3/)
This accidental sequence seems to have a low probability. In fact, this one was
evaluated with less than 10"5. It is mainly fixed by the probability of having an impact
of the lightning on the installation while the gas sky of the reactors is in direct
communication with the chimney.
Two elements come into view for this sequence :
• the malfunction of the emergency power unit ;
• the opening of the « double-effect » valves.
3.2.1 Emergency power unit
The first failure is associated with the malfunction of the emergency power unit
(group called «time zero »). It can be noted that the control of this relatively old
equipment was ensured by a group of electromechanical relays. The further analysis
carried out underlined that the possible causes of its absence of operation were
numerous (14 possibilities) and some of them could be random (for example, a
defective contact). Beyond these elements, the principal point which can be retained
for this equipment is the fact that such an electrical power variation was not taken
into account in the design specifications of the material.
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3.2.2 « Double-effect » valves.
The second failure or situation not dealt with, was the opening of the « double-
effect » valves which were normally to be remained in their initial state. The figure

















Figure 3: Diagram of the control chain of the « double-effect » valves.
In the case of a decreasing voltage, the tests carried out on the electronic control
system and the equipment associated made it possible to retain the following
sequence :
the electronic control system stops, prohibiting any operation.
I
the 24 volt relay falls in preferential position
(rest = open).
i
the electrovalve is actuated because relay falls and at the
release voltage, it remains manoeuvrable.
- i
the « double-effect » valves open.
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The decreasing voltage to the entry of the various equipment caused a stop of the
former in an anforeseen state, not allowing to keep the « double-effect » valves in
the initial state.
In this case also, the characteristics of the electrical alimentation was not taken into
account in the design specifications for the electronic control system and the
automatic system of the valves.
3.3 LESSONS
The principal lessons of this accident within the framework of this article are :
• the devices or equipment of safety having recourse to automatism are
obviously not free from potential failures (for example, emergency power
unit) ;
• the definition of the operating range of the important equipment for safety
should be defined. This operating range should be, as far as possible, the
subject of a qualification performed in particular by tests ;
• in this respect, concerning the tests and qualification of equipment, this
accident underlines the interactions between several equipment.
Consequently, possible tests should check the whole of a safety loop.
4. CONCLUSION ABOUT REQUIREMENTS FOR SAFETY DEVICES.
The two accidents described above underline failures of safety systems, which are
mechanical or associated with automatic devices. These failures emphasise the
need of the operating range definition of these systems and their qualification.
In this field, the draft standard IEC 61508 (141), relating to the safety of the electric,
electronic systems and programmable systems, and its adaptation to the industrial
processes through draft standard IEC 61511 (/5/), make it possible to fix a
framework of evaluation. For details, the method associated with this last draft
standard is declined in four parts :
• Analysis and ranking of the risks of an installation ;
• Definition of the technical requirements applicable to the safety devices, this
definition being carried out through classes of requirements ;
• Definition of the qualitative and quantitative requirements ;
• Validation of the technical requirements (analyses or tests).
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Beyond a theoretical analysis, the interest to use tests comes out from these
accidents, as suggested by Kletz (/6/) for others accidents. In this respect, the draft
standard IEC 1511 (//) indicates that the validation of the technical requirements can
be treated through tests : functional tests of safety ; tests of behaviour on defect ;
tests related on the specifications and the environmental parameters.
Such tests must take into account the whole of the « safety loop », including, for
example a sensor, an electronic control system and equipment such as valves.
Moreover, the mechanical behaviour of the equipment should also be tested. The
accidents reported above point it out.
Beyond these considerations, it appears important that this qualification of the safety
devices lies within a more general scope of evaluation of defence lines or defence
barriers {111), with respect to the dangers within an industrial facility. Such an
approach is to be undertaken at the design stage of a plant or before safety devices
modifications.
An evaluation scheme must also integrate the ultimate barrier made up by the
intervention of equipped personnel.
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